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estimates efficiency losses of uniform policy instruments in the presence of spatial 
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significant efficiency losses of uniform policies. Article IV introduces the 
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Introduction 
 
The pollution of certain coastal zones caused by nutrients, such as nitrogen and 
phosphorus, is an increasing problem in certain parts of the world. An increased 
population density of the river basins related to these coastal zones together with 
the following industrial, residential, and agricultural pollution has generated a 
situation in which the environmental services provided of coastal zones decreases 
or loses its value over time (see e.g. Cederwall & Elmgren, 1990; Rabalais et al., 
1996; Turner et al., 1999; Wulff, 2000; Boesch, 2001; Mitsch et al., 2001; Morgan 
& Owens, 2001). Managing coastal zones with regard to land-based pollution 
loads often demands the need to understand the spatial aspects of such 
environmental degradation. To obtain a certain environmental quality in the 
coastal zones at minimum cost requires an understanding regarding how the 
location of pollution sources affects such quality.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze and describe the procedure of reaching 
an efficient and/or cost-effective management of coastal zones, in a case where 
spatial heterogeneity of nitrogen emission sources plays a significant role for the 
optimal way to reach any given target. An efficient load is characterized by the 
fact that no further changes in load can be made without causing reductions in the 
society’s net-gains, while cost-effectiveness implies that any reduction target is 
obtained at minimum cost to the society. When the damage to a coastal zone 
differs for sources, due to their location, good data availability is important. The 
implications of spatial heterogeneity in the quest for a cost-effective policy are 
also analyzed. The empirical application in the first three articles is made for the 
same recipient and its drainage basin, the coastal zone of the Stockholm 
Archipelago. The fourth article is applied to Himmerfjärden and its drainage 
basins, a smaller part of the Stockholm Archipelago river basin. This thesis links 
the benefits with costs of pollution abatement, taking into consideration the 
interdependency between different abatement measures. The concept used could 
easily be transferred to the management of other recipients characterized by 
similar problems. 
 
The purpose of this introduction is to place the four articles into a context, 
deliver a review of the work that has been done regarding cost-effective 
management of ambient targets, and finally explain the scope and contributions of 
the four articles. This introduction is organized as follows; first, the problem of 
eutrophication and its characteristics is provided.  Thereafter, the economics of 
coastal zone management under spatial heterogeneity is explained, and a literature 
review related to the subject is provided. The main findings and contributions of 
the four articles are finally presented, together with suggestions for further 
research regarding these problems.  
 
Description of the eutrophication in the Stockholm Archipelago  
The Stockholm Archipelago together with its river basin is the area studied in the 
first three articles, while Himmerfjärden and its catchment is studied in the fourth,   14
in which the marine water of the Baltic Sea is the recipient of concern. The river 
basin for the Stockholm Archipelago is the geographical area from which the 
major part of the nitrogen load to this recipient originates. This river basin covers 
an area of about 26,500 km2 of which Lake Mälaren accounts for a little more 
than four percent. Forest dominate the land, covering 51 percent of the area, while 
arable land accounts for 17 and pasture for two percent. Himmerfjärden, the area 
studied in article IV, is located in the southern part of the Stockholm Archipelago 
and covers an area of 1286 km2. This area is separated into four coastal water 
basins, defined by the sea bottom thresholds, and their respective drainage basin. 
The study areas are chosen due to the availability of data regarding emission 
sources, their respective impact on the recipient (Johansson, 1989: Statistics 
Sweden, 1995; Johnsson & Hoffman, 1997; Elmgren & Larsson, 1997; Engqvist, 
1997; Arheimer & Brandt, 1998; Persson et al., 1989; Willén, 2001; Färlin, 2002) 
and estimates of the damage caused by the eutrophication in the Archipelago 
(Söderqvist & Scharin, 2000; Sandström et al., 2000; Soutukorva, 2001).  
 
Nutrients, i.e. nitrogen and phosphorus, from rural as well as urban sources 
within the drainage basin, cause an eutrophication of the coastal zone. The process 
of eutrophication, i.e. an increase of carbon supply to the water mass, is generated 
by an increase in the load of nutrients to the recipient stimulating the growth of 
plants (Nixon, 1985). The Baltic Sea and its coastal zones are suffering from the 
effects of eutrophication, caused by the increased inflow of nutrients. This has 
generated higher primary production in the photic zone of the sea, causing 
decreased water transparency, increased algae blooms, increased frequency and 
severity of oxygen deficiency in bottom waters, as well as reduction of the bottom 
fauna (Cederwall & Elmgren, 1990). Phosphorus is excluded from the discussion, 
since nitrogen is the limiting nutrient of coastal areas of this part of the Baltic 
(Granéli et al., 1990). The limiting nutrient is the one currently determining the 
level of primary production. No reductions of the primary production will, 
therefore, occur by reducing the non-limiting nutrient, i.e. phosphorus, to the 
Archipelago.   
 
 
Economics of coastal zone management 
 
In this chapter, the economic characteristics of the pollution in a coastal zone are 
described. Economics, as a science, provides a toolbox able to determine the 
necessary conditions for reaching an environmental target at least cost. Apart from 
explaining the problem from an economic perspective, the steps linking costs of 
abatement with the benefits of the same is described. How to reach a cost-effective 
allocation of abatement using different policy instruments is also discussed. 
Finally, a review of the literature on recipient management under spatial 
heterogeneity of sources is provided. 
  
Market imperfections 
Nitrogen emission from sources is, in economic terms, regarded as a negative 
externality. This means that the producer of this pollutant is not forced to consider   15
the effect the environmental damage, caused by this pollutant, has on the utility of 
a third person. For example, a farmer located in the river basin is not forced to 
consider how downstream reduction in water transparency affects an individual 
when determining how much fertilizer to apply on his land. This is reflected in 
that the producers cost of producing one more unit (marginal cost) of the good is 
less then the society’s marginal cost of this production, since the latter includes the 
cost of damage. If the product’s market price is determined by the producer’s 
marginal cost it will send the wrong signal to the buyers, generating an 
overproduction of this good or service, thereby implying that the nitrogen load to 
the Archipelago is larger than what would be the case if the society’s costs were 
included into the decision function of the polluter and thereby the market price.  
 
The damage of the nitrogen load is taking place in the Stockholm Archipelago. 
The Stockholm Archipelago is a unique area from a natural point of view, 
exhibiting great recreational and esthetical values to people. This coastal zone can 
be regarded as a common pool resource with open access, since no person can be 
restricted from enjoying the Archipelago’s recreational value, a value not 
necessarily decreasing by the consumption of a third person. This non-
excludability and non-rivalry of the consumption of water quality in the 
Archipelago is in economic terms referred to as a public good. Therefore, the load 
of nitrogen, caused by various activities, reaching the Stockholm Archipelago is 
described as a negative externality on a public good. Under these circumstances an 
efficient load cannot be obtained without government intervention internalizing 
the cost of damage caused by nitrogen emissions into the polluter’s decision rule. 
 
Efficiency, cost-effectiveness and policy instruments under 
spatial heterogeneity 
If the marginal cost of damage caused by the nitrogen load, exceeds the marginal 
cost of reducing this damage, reductions must be made in order to obtain 
efficiency (Pareto-optimality). An efficient load is found at a point where the 
marginal damage of eutrophication is equal to the marginal abatement cost of 
reducing this load. That is, where the cost of reducing the load by one unit equals 
the benefits of such reduction. Pareto-optimality is achieved if the implemented 
policy internalizes the cost of eutrophication into the polluter’s production 
decision in a way guaranteeing that each source is confronted with the damage 
cost generated by its emissions. Connecting costs of abatement with actual 
benefits triggered by abatement is necessary in order to determine the Pareto-
optimal nitrogen load. The efficient load is induced if sources are subject to a 
charge equal to the marginal damage they cause to the recipient. 
 
However, Pareto-optimality in the use of resources is not necessarily always the 
objective of decision makers. Reduction targets might be determined by other 
facts, especially if the information required to determine the Pareto-optimal level 
is not available. In an attempt to balance the negative consequences of 
eutrophication, e.g. anoxic deep waters, with the positive effects of increased 
nutrient availability, i.e. higher fish catches, Rosenberg et al. (1990) suggests that 
management of the Baltic Sea should strive for a load of nutrients representative   16
of the mid-1950’s. This may be one of the reasons behind the, seemingly 
arbitrarily selected, goal of a 50 percent reduction of nutrient inputs to the Baltic 
Sea (Helcom, 1993). Even under such a non Pareto-optimal target, it is desirable 
to obtain cost-effectiveness in the allocation of abatement measures. Cost-
effectiveness requires that abatement measures be allocated so that no further 
reductions of the load can be made without increasing the cost. 
 
In order to achieve the targeted nitrogen load to the Archipelago, some kind of 
policy has to be implemented forcing the sources of this pollutant to internalize the 
additional cost of eutrophication. Since the marginal abatement cost to the 
recipient differs between sources, a policy considering the spatial differences 
between sources is necessary in order to achieve a cost-effective allocation of 
abatement measures. The use of a uniform policy instrument such as uniform tax, 
uniform required percentage reduction, or uniform quantity of reduction, would 
under these circumstances not reach the targeted reduction at the least cost 
(transaction costs excluded), since it is based on the assumption that the damage 
generated by a unit of emissions is the same for all sources. There are several 
options in the setting of a policy aimed at reducing the pollutants from specific 
sources. Whether it is optimal to chose market based instruments, such as 
taxes/subsidies and tradable emission/ambient permits, or command-and-control 
instruments, depends to a large degree on the shapes of the marginal cost and 
marginal damage curves, the presences of uncertainties concerning these curves 
and whether there are any thresholds with regard to the damage (see e.g. 
Weitzman, 1974; Kolstad, 1987; Gren, 2004). Furthermore, the choice of policy 
influences the distribution of abatement cost. This might have implications on the 
political feasibility of policies as well as the enforcement costs of policies, the 
former being discussed in article III. 
 
Whether to direct the policy towards emissions or the receptor is the issue of 
several discussions in the literature review below. An ambient based tax would 
only go into effect when the targeted load to receptor is exceeded, while a, so-
called, effluent charge implies that the polluters pay a tax for emissions at source. 
A choice also has to be made whether policies should be uniform or differentiated 
over sources. In the presence of spatial heterogeneity regarding the marginal 
abatement cost to the recipient only the latter guarantees cost-effectiveness. 
However, due to distributional concerns and/or difficulties in monitoring 
compliance the former might be chosen. 
 
Since there exists no market for a good water quality in the Archipelago, a 
hypothetical one has to be constructed in order to obtain some kind of estimate of 
the damage costs to society generated by this pollution. This can be obtained by 
finding out how much people are willing to pay (WTP) for an improvement in the 
water quality of the Archipelago. Water transparency is used as an indication of 
the environmental quality in the Stockholm Archipelago in the study from which 
the value of a reduced eutrophication is obtained (Söderqvist & Scharin, 2000).  
 
Since water transparency in the Archipelago can be regarded as a public good, 
people’s marginal willingness to pay has to be summarized horizontally in order to 
obtain the value of any improvement. Two different survey techniques have been 
applied to obtain this WTP; a contingent valuation (CV) survey (Söderqvist &   17
Scharin, 2000) and a travel cost method (Sandström et.al., 2000; Soutukorva, 
2001). For a description of these methods see for example: Bockstael et al., 
(1987), Bishop & Heberlein (1990), and Freeman (2003). The value obtained by a 
contingent valuation survey can be questioned on the basis of the hypothetical way 
of estimating values and are also subject to a lot of criticism, (see Phillips & 
Zeckhauser, 1989; Diamond & Hausmann, 1994; Carson et al., 2001). Similar 
studies have been done regarding the benefits of the water quality of Chesapeake 
Bay, another coastal zone suffering from eutrophication; see e.g. Morgan & 
Owens (2001), Krupnick (1988), Bockstael et.al.  (1989) and Lipton (2004).  
 
In order to estimate the environmental damage generated by a specific source, 
one must comprehend the environmental chain, which ties this specific pollutant 
source with damage on the recipient. It is vital to complement economic 
information with information made available by natural scientists, in order to link 
socio-economic costs and benefits of managing the water quality of coastal zones. 
Several studies concerning eutrophication have addressed the importance of 
integrating natural and social sciences as well as including spatial concerns when 
dealing with this problem (see e.g. Sharp & Bromley, 1979; Shortle & Dunn, 
1986; Rabalais et al., 1996; Gren et al., 2002; Boesch, 2001; Mitsch et al., 2001; 
Wulff et al., 2001; Elofsson, 2003).  
 
The transport of pollutants from a specific source to the recipient gives rise to 
problems of environmental allocation in space. Transfer functions need to be 
established that relate an emissions source at one point in space to an ambient 
level of concentration at another point. In this thesis the transformation of nitrogen 
on its trajectory from source to recipient, which differs between sources, is 
established in order to connect emissions with damage. The proportion of the 
emission reaching a receptor differs due to differences in the buffering capabilities 
of the trajectory paths connecting emissions with load to recipient, a common 
characteristics for pollutants transported by water. The links between source and 
recipient can be summarized in three basic steps: production of emissions, 
transport of pollutants from source to recipient, and damage generated at recipient 
due to the concentration of the pollutant. 
 
The first link implies identification of the sources causing this damage on the 
water quality of the recipient. The major part of the nitrogen load to the 
Archipelago originates from sources within its river basin. In this river basin the 
main sources of nitrogen are wastewater treatment plants, leakage from farmed 
land caused by the deposition of fertilizers, atmospheric deposition, industrial 
discharge into water, and leakage from forests. This thesis focuses on the first two 
of these sources due to data constraints. The sources are separated with regard to 
whether they discharge directly into a water body or if they originate from land. 
This distinction is motivated by the fact that land originated sources are subject to 
the buffering capabilities of land as well as Lake Mälaren, while direct discharges 
only are subject to the buffering capabilities of the latter, if not located adjacent to 
the recipient. Sources are further separated with regard to in which of the river 
basin’s 33 drainage basins they are located. The same discussion applies to 
Himmerfjärden, by replacing the lake basins of Lake Mälaren with the coastal   18
basins of Himmerfjärden and the Archipelago with the marine water of the Baltic 
Sea. 
 
The next link is to determine the proportion of indirect nitrogen discharges 
caused by fertilizer deposition that reaches the water body of either lake Mälaren 
or the Archipelago. Plants utilize some part of the deposited nitrogen, while a 
fraction leaks away from the root zone. Leaching of nitrogen from fertilization is a 
function of crop management, water run-off, soil type and meteorological 
conditions (Johnsson & Hoffman, 1997). Leaching nitrogen from land deposition 
can thereafter reach a recipient by water transportation, during which it is subject 
to plant assimilation, sedimentation and denitrification, reducing the amount of 
nitrogen. The fraction of nitrogen that does not reach a water body, is referred to 
as retention. Geohydrology, soil-type, land cover, topography, and climate are 
some of the factors determining retention. Leaching and retention therefore 
determine the load to either Lake Mälaren or the Archipelago from land deposited 
nitrogen. The region studied is characterized by great variations in retention 
(Arheimer & Brandt, 1998). Uncertainty regarding this retention of the pollutants 
has implications on the cost of reaching a probabilistic pollutant load target. 
 
As mentioned, direct discharges into a waterbody are not subject to land 
retention. The nitrogen load into either Mälaren or the Archipelago of adjacent 
drainage basins is the sum of the proportion of indirect discharges that reaches the 
water body in question and the direct discharges into this waterbody. Lake 
Mälaren is located in the center of the river basin and can be divided into five lake 
basins. The nutrient sink capacity of these different basins is of great significance 
in determining the different impacts on the Archipelago of depositions originated 
from adjacent drainage basins (Persson et al., 1989). This capacity is a function of 
factors such as spatial variation in temperature, water residence time, variation of 
hydrography, lake area and volume, and inorganic nitrogen concentrations 
(Arheimer & Brandt, 1998). Nitrogen is transported within Lake Mälaren 
eastwards towards the Archipelago. The nitrogen load to any lake basin is, 
therefore, subject to its own buffering capacity as well as the buffering capacity of 
any downstream lake basin. 
 
The nitrogen load to Stockholm Archipelago originates from adjacent drainage 
basins and the inflow of nitrogen by Norrström, which connects this recipient with 
Lake Mälaren and its drainage basins. After the linkage between emission of 
nitrogen sources and their load to the Archipelago is established, the effect this 
load has on the nitrogen concentration needs to be determined. This nitrogen load 
effects the concentration of the same in the Archipelago, which in turn causes the 
eutrophication (Wulff et al., 2001). This concentration can be linked to one of the 
effects of eutrophication, namely the decrease in water transparency. Färlin (2002) 
determined the relationship between nitrogen concentration and Secchi-depth in 
the Archipelago during the summer months. 
 
There are several abatement measures available to reduce the nitrogen load to 
the Archipelago. The costs of these measures have to be determined. Due to the 
transformation of nitrogen on its path to the recipient, these cost estimates have to 
be divided by the fraction of nitrogen reaching the recipient in order to obtain an 
estimate regarding each measure’s cost of reducing the load to the recipient.   19
Having linked sources with damage, and costs of abatement with the benefits it 
generates, it is possible to determine the optimal nitrogen load to the Archipelago 
and the cost-effective allocation of abatement measures of reaching such load as 
well as any other targeted load. 
 
In conclusion, managing a water recipient from a drainage basin perspective in a 
cost-effective way requires information regarding data over emission sources, 
abatement measures, as well as models describing the  relationship between 
emissions and damage on a recipient. Spatial heterogeneity of sources affects the 
costs of abatement as well as the most suitable policy instrument for realizing the 
objective target in a cost-effective way.  
 
Literature review regarding optimal policy under spatial 
heterogeneity  
There is an abundance of literature concerning the management of a recipient 
under spatially heterogeneous conditions. The hardship lies in designing a policy 
instrument generating the cost-effective allocation of abatement between the 
different pollutant sources, in the presence of spatial heterogeneity. The objective 
of the following literature review is to give an overview of how theoretical and 
empirical studies have evolved in order to determine the optimal management of 
the environment in the presence of spatial heterogeneity in marginal abatement 
cost to a recipient. 
 
The major part of the discussion in the articles has been regarding whether an 
effluent charge is the least-cost policy to reach an ambient quality target (of either 
air or water) or not. Along with the theoretical framework of the different policies 
many case studies have been made as well. During the seventies discussions 
evolved around the quest for a least-cost strategy to reach a certain ambient air or 
water quality target. The articles consisted of theoretical and empirical studies in 
which the spatial heterogeneity of pollution sources played a significant part. First, 
the articles highlighting the spatial aspect with regard to the source recipient 
approach are presented. Thereafter, articles regarding the quest for the best policy 
to achieve an ambient target are reviewed. Articles criticizing the use of effluent 
charges, and market based polices in general, in reaching ambient targets are then 
described, followed by articles suggesting policies directed at the ambient 
environmental state. A review is thereafter made regarding articles comparing and 
trying to explain the underlying cause regarding the magnitude of cost differences 
between the alternative policies. Finally, the debate in the American Economic 
Review whether policies should be determined on a national or local level is 
summarized.  
 
Ambient quality targets vs. effluent charges 
This section will give a summary of the pioneer articles concerning cost-effective 
policies for an ambient target under spatial heterogeneity, especially focusing on 
the discussion regarding effluent charges. 
   20
Kneese  (1964, p. 108) introduces the term effluent charges in his seminal book 
The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management. Effluent charges would 
be set so to induce upstream abatement activity as long as the cost of such 
abatement is less than the marginal downstream damage costs, thereby implying 
efficiency in abatement. An effluent charge would reach the ambient quality target 
at lower social cost than policies requiring uniform treatment or uniform reduction 
in effluent discharges by each discharger. However, whether it represents the least 
cost strategy is debated in several of the articles reviewed. A first step to estimate 
the damage caused by pollution of waterways is taken by Kneese & Bower (1968). 
They are also the first to empirically examine the differences in costs between 
uniform and spatially differentiated policies. 
 
The initial framework model for reflecting the physical links between emissions 
of pollutants with the damage they cause, as described in the previous section, is 
developed by Russell (1971), and Russell & Spofford (1972). Rather than meeting 
ambient air and water quality standards, the authors maximize the social welfare 
subject to constraints on levels of production, and consumption as well as 
requirements for transports, treatment, and discharge of residuals. The initial step 
of their model is to include a production function relating inputs with outputs. 
Thereafter, an environmental diffusion model connecting the discharge point with 
the locations of one or several receptor is presented. Finally, a receptor damage 
function describing the presence of the pollutant in the receptor with the resulting 
damages is established. Their model illustrates the connection between costs and 
benefits of any ambient reduction target. 
 
Baumol & Oates (1971) emphasize the hardship of determining the optimal 
effluent charge for an ambient target as well as the benefits these generate in an 
empirical setting.  According to the authors the optimal Pigouvian tax cannot be 
determined a priori for the new damage level since damage functions are likely to 
change with the state of the environment. The authors suggest a system of 
standards and prices, ‘the environmental pricing and standards procedure’, that are 
more flexible and determined by the ambient water or air quality target. The 
optimal uniform effluent charge is found by an iterative procedure directed by the 
difference between actual and targeted emissions, whereby an initial rough 
estimate of such charge is used and then varied over time until the desired ambient 
pollution standard is achieved. The authors admit that the ‘method will, in general, 
not result in an optimal allocation of resources, but the procedure will at least 
represent the least-cost method of realizing the specific standards’ (p.51). One of 
this policy’s advantages, according to the authors, is that it is not dependent on 
huge amount of information. Baumol (1972) suggest that the analysis is applicable 
for air pollution as well. 
 
Tietenberg (1973a; 1973b), on the other hand, claims that such a uniform 
effluent charge cannot represent the least-cost solution in the presence of spatial 
heterogeneity regarding the effect emissions have on the concentration of 
pollutants at a specific receptor. His solution to the problem is a modification of 
the Baumol-Oates’s model (1971). By applying the Baumol-Oates’s model for 
each zone under a spatially differentiated policy over several zones instead of only 
one, cost-effectiveness of reaching an ambient quality target is achieved.   21
However, the author points out that the administrative information requirements of 
a differentiated policy are larger than for a uniform, and also that the political 
feasibility of such a policy might be uncertain due to its distributional effects. 
Tietenberg states that ‘the optimal number of zones is that number such that for 
any larger number of zones the marginal transaction costs of administrating one 
more zone would exceed the marginal gain in resource cost reduction and for any 
smaller number of zones the marginal gains in resource cost reduction of an 
increase in zones would exceed the marginal transaction costs of administrating 
the policy for a larger set of zones’ (1973a, p.202). Exactly where this point lies is 
an empirical question and cannot be determined a priori according to Tietenberg. 
Another argument against the use of a uniform effluent charge is that it provides 
no incentives to the emitters to relocate their production to areas where the 
damage caused by their emissions is less.  
 
Abrams & Barr (1974) show how an estimated set of differentiated charges on 
the application of fertilizer nitrogen can be applied into the environmental pricing 
and standards system (EPS) of Baumol & Oates. The authors use a spatial linear 
programming model to link the agricultural use of nitrogen fertilizers with the 
nitrate concentration of Illinois surface waters. They estimate how differentiated 
taxes affect the net income of farmers differently depending on their location, as 
well as how it affects the agricultural market and thereby agricultural production 
in adjacent regions. 
 
Horner (1975) supports the Baumol-Oates proposition that effluent charges can 
achieve a specified level of water quality at lowest possible cost (under the 
questionable assumption that transaction costs do not differ with different 
policies). He presents a concise review of the case for effluent charges. The area 
studied is the two hydrological basins of the San Joaquin valley in California. 
However, he only compares the cost of effluent charges with no control and with 
the cost of removing nitrate-nitrogen (NO3–N) by a treatment plant, excluding a 
comparison with a cost-effective policy.  
 
Hamlen (1977) provides additional support to the Baumol-Oates’ claim that an 
effluent charge represents the least-cost policy to reach an ambient target. His 
extension of their model proves that, even though the allocation of resources is not 
optimal under an effluent charge, it represents the quasi-optimal Pareto solution 
(i.e. second-best) for a competitive economy in the sense that consumers will have 
maximized their utility for the given pollution level. The author develops a 
theoretical approach for estimating the proper effluent tax using available 
econometric or input-output models for the region of interest. However, these 
estimates require more information than the problem considered by Baumol and 
Oates (1972), but would, on the other hand, require fewer iterations in the search 
of an optimal effluent charge. 
 
Tietenberg (1978a) questions the result of Hamlen (1977), based on the 
limitation of the author’s model. His argument is based on the questionable 
assumption of Hamlen’s model that the pollutant transfer coefficient does not 
differ between emitters. That is, the proportion of emissions that reaches a 
recipient does not vary between sources. Literature of natural science concerning 
pollutants transformation in nature (see Kneese, 1971b) reveals that this is rarely   22
the case, but rather, the fraction reaching the recipient varies from emitter to 
emitter.  
 
‘To explore a number of economic, administrative and legal issues, which 
impinge on the design of a system of effluent charges to achieve the national 
ambient air quality standards at minimum costs’ is the objective of the next article 
by Tietenberg (1978b, p.265). He seeks out to find out the nature of an effluent 
charge fulfilling the conditions of cost-effectiveness. Should such a charge be 
uniform or spatially differentiated and should it be implemented nationally or 
locally are the questions the author is interested in. Tietenberg points out that a 
‘spatially differentiated policy can be implemented for several different degrees, 
and a uniform charge represents merely the extreme case of zero spatial 
differentiation’ (p.266). How to determine the degree of spatial differentiation of 
emission charges is discussed at length in this article, and he argues that it should 
be regarded as a policy variable. The author also discusses the administrative 
practicality of a spatially differentiated charge as opposed to a uniform policy. He 
comes to the conclusions that not only are spatially differentiated charges cost-
effective but also realistic, since the only additional information required in 
moving from a uniform towards a differentiated emission fee is the transfer 
coefficient linking the emissions from sources with the load to a recipient.  
 
Tietenberg extends his analysis to the marketable emission permits in reaching 
an ambient air standard (Tietenberg, 1980), in which a dynamic dimension 
regarding the emission patterns is added to the model. The policy of an ambient 
differentiated permit is in this article compared, in terms of costs as well as 
administrative feasibility, to an emission discharge permit. The author notes that 
administrative costs of an ambient differentiated control scheme implies the 
desirability and even optimality of a zoned system lying intermediate between the 
two extremes of spatial uniformity and full spatial differentiation. Tietenberg 
comes to the conclusion that an ambient differentiated permit has potential to 
achieve air quality goals at a minimum cost, if certain administrative obstacles 
could be dealt with. 
 
Bohm & Russell (1985) suggest that in the general case of multiple ambient 
standards, and lack of information on total control cost, an iterative procedure may 
eventually lead to achievement of the ambient standards. However, their main 
conclusion is that there is no guarantee that this is the cost-effective way of 
meeting the standards. The authors’ show how the case made by Kneese (1964) 
has to be modified as inconvenient elements of reality is explicitly recognized and 
dealt with. 
 
In a paper by Ermoliev, Klassen, & Netjes (1996), the pricing approach of 
environmental pollution originally proposed by Baumol and Oates is extended to 
the case of multiple receptors. The authors prove that environmental agencies can 
develop a charge adjustment procedure, such as suggested by Baumol and Oates, 
that achieves ambient standards at multiple receptors at minimum costs, and fairly 
quickly. The regulator’s difficulty to obtain full information concerning the 
pollution control cost for every single emission source, which is necessary in order 
to reach an ambient target in a cost-effective way, is emphasized in this paper. As 
opposed to the conclusion by Bohm & Russell (1985), the authors prove that it is   23
possible to determine a vector of ambient charges and resulting emission charges 
to attain standards at minimum costs. However, due to its complexity and the time 
of converging, such a system might not be considered practical according to the 
authors. Their conclusion is that it makes no real difference for the feasibility of 
emission charges whether environmental targets are formulated in terms of 
emission goals or a set of ambient concentration standards, even if the central 
agency has no information on the control costs of sources. 
 
In a theoretical paper, Zylicz (2003) models cost-effective pollution reduction in 
a drainage basin, and compares the ability of market based policy instruments 
(taxes and tradable permits) to reach a target reduction level at one or several 
recipients. In his model Zylicz assumes linear functional relationships regarding 
discharges and their effect on the recipient. That both taxes and tradable permits 
can be used to achieve cost-effective abatement is proven by economic theory. 
Zylicz points out that the information requirements differ between the two 
instruments, in that the marginal abatement cost must be known to the policy 
maker in order to determine the taxes generating the target load reduction, which 
is not the case for tradable permits. The author states that in the presence of 
significant fixed costs of abatement measures market based instruments alone 
cannot generate a cost-effective solution.  
 
Criticism against effluent charges 
A number of articles have criticized the use of a market based policy instrument, 
such as an effluent charge. This criticism has been based on the hardship of 
implementing market based policies, as well as the complexity that is often the 
case when dealing with ambient targets in the presence of asymmetric information. 
 
An article questioning the feasibility of effluent charges, and market based 
policies in general, is presented by Rose-Ackerman (1973). She emphasizes the 
hardship of establishing and enforcing compliance of an effluent charge, whether 
it is uniform or spatially differentiated, and argues that any real world application 
of such a policy would be likely to fail due to its complexity. The author argues 
for the use of command-and-control instrument. 
 
That effluent charges would be more cost-effective than uniform reduction 
standards, as claimed by Horner (1975), is questioned by Jacobs & Casler (1979). 
They compare both the social cost and the cost to farmers of achieving given 
levels of reduction in phosphorus discharge from crop reduction. Costs are 
estimated for effluent taxes as well as uniform reduction in the Falls Creek 
watershed of New York State. In their case the total cost of an effluent charge 
adding the reduction of income of the farmer is 2.7 to 13.3 times higher than the 
cost of a uniform reduction policy. As Tietenberg (1973a; 1973b), they also point 
out that the resulting inequity in redistribution of income caused by an effluent 
charge might be hard for society to accept. 
 
Helfand & House’s (1995) objective is to make an empirical evaluation of 
policies to reduce the pollution of non-point-sources (NPS) under heterogeneous 
conditions. Their article focuses on policy instruments on inputs, which are 
motivated due to the hardships of implementing differentiated policies. The study   24
considers empirical costs associated with uniform input taxes and regulations 
regarding the lettuce production in California on two different types of soil. 
Results indicate that regulations imply higher profits for farmers compared to 
taxes. Helfand and House emphasize the difficulties of getting compliance under a 
differentiated tax on fertilizers since this input can be resold on the market. The 
authors come to the conclusion that a uniform input regulation is not necessarily 
that inefficient if chosen carefully. However, the authors points out, that as areas 
under study become more heterogeneous it is likely that the social cost of uniform 
instruments increase.                                                                                                                                       
 
Ambient target based policies 
As opposed to policies directly aimed at emissions several alternative policies 
have been proposed towards developing cost-effective policies aimed, at the 
concentration of the pollutant in question at the recipient. That is, instead of taxing 
and monitoring emissions, the load to a recipient is taxed and monitored.  
 
In a seminal paper by Montgomery (1972), the theoretical workability of an 
ambient-differentiated emission permit system is demonstrated. The author 
analyzes two systems of marketable pollution permits: a system of “pollution 
licenses” that defines allowable emissions in terms of pollutant concentrations at a 
set of receptor points and a system of “emission licenses” that directly grants the 
right to emit pollutants up to a specified rate.  Montgomery shows that a system of 
“pollution licenses” generates a market equilibrium that coincides with the least-
cost solution for attaining any predetermined level of environmental quality 
regardless of initial allocation of licenses among polluters.  
 
Krupnick et al. (1983) propose a pollution-offset scheme, in which sources of 
emissions are free to trade emission permits subject to the constraint of no 
violations of the predetermined air-quality standard at any receptor. This scheme is 
a modification of Montgomery’s (1972) system of emission licenses. Their 
suggestion is a hybrid of both the emission- and the ambient permit systems. The 
authors criticize Montgomery’s policy (1972) based on the unrealistic conditions 
under which it works, as well as for excluding the role of transaction costs, which 
they claim are likely to be quite high for his system of pollution licenses. The 
offset-scheme is claimed to be preferable over other systems with regard to 
minimizing total abatement cost as well as transaction costs. The authors define 
permits in terms of emission and allow their sale among polluters but not on a one-
to-one basis (Emission permit system character), thereby implying a spatially 
differentiated emission based system. Transfers of permissions are only allowed if 
the air-quality standard at any receptor point is not violated. Like the emission 
permit system, it involves the purchase and sale of permits but like the ambient 
permit system, the ratio at which permits exchange for one another depends on the 
relative effects of the associated emissions on ambient air quality at receptor 
points. According to the authors, Montgomery’s requirement that any transactions 
among polluters result in no increase in pollutant concentrations at any receptor 
point, is unnecessarily restrictive, and generates an outcome that will not coincide 
with the least cost solution. They conclude that the trading equilibrium under the 
offset system coincides with the least-cost solution irrespective of the initial   25
allocation of emission permits. Like the ambient permit system, a suitable 
designed offset system can achieve the predetermined standards for air quality at 
the least cost for any initial allocation off emission permits, but this system would 
require less transactions. An advantage of this system, according to the authors, is 
that it makes modest demands regarding transaction costs of sources as well as 
administering agency. 
 
Segerson (1988) questions the feasibility of direct regulations of emission levels, 
such as effluent charges, from nonpoint source pollutants due to monitoring 
difficulties and uncertainties, and calls for policy instruments focusing on the 
ambient quality instead. According to the author it is impossible to neglect the 
physical uncertainty in the linkage between abatement and damage, as well as the 
stochastic relationship between discharge and ambient pollution level. She 
proposes an incentive scheme involving a linear tax/subsidy and lump sum fixed 
penalty/subsidy based on the observed deviation on the ambient pollution 
concentration from a target. Segerson emphasizes the difficulties to relate the 
ambient quality to the actions of an individual polluter in the presence of many 
polluters. To eliminate the problem of free-riding, she suggests a uniform tax over 
all sources equal to the marginal damage. According to Segerson, such a scheme 
requires little government interference, guarantees long-run efficiency, eliminates 
free-riding, and only requires monitoring of the ambient pollutant level. 
 
Horan, Shortle, & Abler, (1998) criticize Segerson’s assumption that the 
distribution of emissions is determined by a single variable, i.e. abatement. They 
prove that Segersons’ linear ambient tax scheme only works in the special cases 
where less than three production decisions influence emissions or when there are 
no risk effects associated with the use of different inputs. They extend Segerson’s 
scheme by exploring the design of ambient taxes when the distribution of each 
source’s emissions, which are stochastic and not directly observable by firms or 
the regulator, depends on the polluter’s choices over a set of variables. The 
authors suggest a linear and non-linear ambient taxes depending on the 
environmental state of the receptor. Uniform state dependent linear ambient taxes 
are here determined ex post optimal since, unlike the state-independent tax, 
polluters have an incentive, at the margin, to consider the impact of each input on 
expected damages. However, even in these special cases, additional instruments 
may be needed to ensure that the long-run efficiency condition is satisfied.  
 
In a more recent paper, Horan, Shortle, & Abler, (2002) extend the analysis by 
considering the design of ambient taxes for risk-neutral and risk-averse polluters 
under asymmetric information about environmental relationships and probabilities 
associated with random events. The authors show that a linear ambient tax in 
which the tax rate on the ambient base is state-independent can be efficient only 
when the covariance between marginal damage and the marginal effects of firms’ 
choices on ambient pollution is zero for all firms and inputs. They emphasize the 
information requirements for both firms and agency, and that the benefits of 
ambient based instruments are lost when polluters and the regulatory agency have 
asymmetric information and heterogeneous expectations about nonpoint pollution 
processes, and when some polluters are risk-averse. The authors come to the 
conclusion that optimal ambient taxes must be differentiated in the presence of   26
asymmetric information about environmental relationships and probabilities 
associated with random events. They also propose a firm-specific lump-sum 
tax/subsidy in order to obtain long-run efficiency. To require firms’ choices to be 
monitored along with ambient pollution levels would generally increase the 
transaction costs of an ambient system. According to the authors, a linear ambient 
tax with a state dependent rate equal to marginal damages, and a nonlinear 
ambient tax where each firm pays an amount equal to total damages can induce 
efficient input choices.  
 
An extension to the work by Segerson (1988) and Horan et al. (1998, 2002) is 
given by Hansen, (2002), in which he introduces stochastic dependence of firm 
emissions being restrictive since common stochastic effects, such as weather, may 
cause covariance in firms’ emissions.  Hansen proposes a linear variance based tax 
for small number stochastic non-point pollution problems where the damage 
function is convex. Such policy eliminates the need for firm level information and 
rate differentiation, while retaining implementation in dominant strategies 
according to the author.  
 
Comparative analysis of efficiency losses between different policies 
The main argument for a certain type of policy is its ability to achieve the ambient 
target at least-cost. Not surprisingly, therefore, several empirical studies have 
focused on estimating and comparing the cost of different polices under different 
circumstances. However, few of these studies have included the transaction cost 
related to the policy in question, implying that the resulting deviations in costs 
between two policies must be regarded with caution. 
 
Kneese (1971a) applies the theoretical framework of Russell-Spofford in 
connecting pollutants with the damage they cause in a case study regarding the 
management of several waterborne pollutants to the Delaware estuary. The author 
estimates the costs of a uniform charge and a uniform reduction and compares 
them with the cost of a cost-effective solution. Kneese’s results indicated large 
cost differences between uniform cutbacks and cost minimization, but small 
between uniform charge and cost minimization. The author also discussed the 
problems of the present policies of this time in achieving an optimal allocation of 
abatement, such as the fact that border of significance for regional pollution 
problems  (e.g. watersheds) rarely coincide with the jurisdictional borders of 
management. He promotes effluent charges over subsidies and encourages the role 
of regional agencies.  
 
Atkinson & Lewis (1974), compare the cost of a policy that is cost-effective at 
source (e.g. a uniform effluent charge) with the present policy in the U.S. at that 
time referred to as the state implementation plan (i.e. a uniform reduction standard 
at sources), and compares these costs to a policy that ensures cost-effectiveness at 
recipient. The approach is static in that it targets the average level of ambient 
concentrations of sulphur dioxide across air-shed, in the St. Louis air quality 
control region. Their results indicate that annual total regional control cost of the 
state implementation plan is as much as ten times larger than those for the cost-  27
effective policy. The authors find that a policy only cost-effective at source is 
twice as costly as the policy cost-effective at recipient. 
 
The procedure to find the optimal effluent charge proposed by Baumol-Oates is 
applied in a paper by Herzog, (1976). The author compares the cost of three 
different policies with the cost of a cost-effective policy of reducing Biochemical 
Oxygen Demand (BOD) and nitrogen discharges to the Patuxent river of Maryland 
(U.S.). The cost of a weighted charge, i.e. differentiated between regions, is in this 
case 6 percent higher than the cost-effective, while the cost of a uniform charge is 
22.2 percent higher. Finally, the policy of a uniform percentage treatment turns out 
to be 29 percent higher. Herzog uses a tatonnement procedure to determine the 
uniform charge as well as the different weighted charges required in order to reach 
the target. 
 
Two classes of permit markets, emission based permit system and ambient 
permit system, are compared in an article by Atkinson & Tietenberg (1982). The 
former system includes two types of spatially differentiated permits while the 
latter includes three types of multiple zoned emission permits, where trading 
across zones is prohibited. The objective of their study is to determine how these 
two different markets and their modifications affect the air quality of multiple 
receptors, emissions, and costs. The empirical study concerns the particulate 
control of the St. Louis air quality. Compliance costs, as a function of permit 
design, are included in their cost estimates. Their result shows that all permit 
designs cause lower compliance cost at all levels of control than the current State 
Implementation Plan (SIP) approach, focusing on non-transferable emission 
standards. Cost advantages of the ambient permit systems are explained by the fact 
that they allow substantially more emissions while achieving the ambient target. 
The disadvantage of the ambient permit market is its complexity, requiring each 
source to generally have to purchase several of the receptor-oriented permits. 
Their results indicate that for all permit designs, permit expenditures are more than 
half of total cost for less severe degrees of control but they become a less 
significant proportion of total cost as the degree of control is increased. The 
authors claim that all policies except the pure ambient permit policy create 
incentives for an emission source to locate within the same area, a so-called hot 
spot problem. The authors find advantages and disadvantages with all policies, 
which leads to their suggestion of the possibility of a policy, which is a hybrid of 
all the different designs in this study. 
 
Mendelsohn (1986) analyzes pollution regulation in the presence of 
heterogeneity in benefits and costs. He emphasizes the possibilities of 
improvements by a thorough examination of how to optimally differentiate 
environmental standards across pollutants and space. The findings of Weitzman’s 
(1974) paper ‘Prices vs. Quantities’ are used with regard to unobserved variations 
in the benefits of abatement from heterogeneous polluters. The purpose of the 
paper is to examine how regulations ought to adapt to the heterogeneity of 
emissions as well as the heterogeneity of environments. Mendelsohn considers 
multiple trading regions as he develops and applies a model for differentiated 
tradable permits among pollutants and source locations. The author compares the 
cost of a uniform market, in which the trading ratio between permits is on the one-  28
to-one basis, with five different degrees of differentiated markets regarding sulfur 
dioxide bubble markets of coal-fired power plants in Connecticut (see 
Mendelsohn, 1980). Mendelsohn shows that marginal benefits of spatial 
differentiation drop as the degree of this differentiation increase. In accordance 
with Tietenberg (1973a), Mendelsohn states that the optimal degree of spatial 
differentiation is found where the marginal reduced loss of an additional degree of 
spatial differentiation equals its marginal administrative cost. He also deals with 
how efficiency losses are affected by the distribution of sources and impact. 
Mendelsohn points out that any presence of skewness has implications on the 
efficiency loss of uniform policies. One possible way of achieving a more 
effective degree of spatial division would be to simply create a single zone for 
those regions corresponding to this fat tail of distribution. In Mendelsohn’s case, 
variation in marginal costs as well as covariance of marginal benefits and marginal 
costs affect the choice over a price instrument or a quantity instrument, while 
variation in marginal damages does not directly influence this choice. 
 
Krupnick (1986) compares the cost of five different policies: an ambient 
marketable permit policy (i.e. least-cost spatially differentiated policy), a policy 
where emissions trading is restricted to sources of the same type (regardless of 
location), a uniform effluent fee irrespective of source type and location, a 
command-and-control policy, and finally a command-and-control/least cost 
hybrid. Costs are estimated for meeting the nitrogen dioxide standards in 
Baltimore from a multiple type of sources. In Krupnick’s study a uniform fee turns 
out to be eight times as costly as a spatially differentiated least cost policy due to 
severe over control, while a source type specific fee is only four percent more 
costly. 
 
Tietenberg (1988) provides a summary regarding the result of nine studies 
estimating the efficiency losses of command-and-control policies in comparison to 
least cost policies aimed at air pollution control. These results indicate additional 
costs of command-and-control policies in comparison with a cost-effective 
solution ranging in order of magnitude from 1.07 to 22. 
 
Using four different sediment transport models over agricultural pollution 
Braden et al. (1989) compare estimated costs of least-cost abatement regimes in a 
central Illinois case study. The optimal allocation of abatement measures depends 
on which of the four models is used. The authors find that substantial 
heterogeneity regarding the locations of abatement measures accentuates the 
desirability of spatial differentiation with regard to agricultural pollution. 
However, they acknowledge implementation problems with a targeted 
management regime, due to difficulties in capturing transport models. 
 
Howe (1994) gives a review of the implementation and success in Europe of 
different policy standards. He supports the claim that a uniform effluent tax will 
not achieve the social optimum in the presences of varying marginal damages. The 
author finds that minimum cost is only guaranteed using multiple zones if the 
diffusion process is linear. 
 
In a study by Brännlund & Gren (1999), a comparison of costs between a 
uniform and a differentiated charge for reducing the nitrogen load to the Baltic Sea   29
caused by fertilizers is made. The costs are estimated for a 20 percent and 50 
percent reduction respectively, considering correlation in input demand elasticity 
and marginal environmental impacts between regions. The efficiency loss of a 
uniform policy corresponds to 17 or 10 percent of the costs of a differentiated 
charge depending on the environmental impact target. 
 
Driving factors behind efficiency losses of uniform instruments under 
spatial heterogeneity  
The explanation of the underlying factors determining the magnitude of cost 
differences between different polices under spatial heterogeneity has been the 
subject of several articles.  
 
The objective of Kolstad (1986) is to understand the characteristics of regulatory 
alternatives for ambient air pollution control. The alternatives compared are: price 
control vs. quantity controls; spatially differentiated vs. uniform controls; and 
command-and-control regulations vs. economic instruments. The author includes 
uncertainty on the part of the regulator in the empirical model. By making plant 
location endogenous the industrial responses to regulation is also incorporated into 
the model. The area studied is the “Four Corners” region of the Southwest United 
States and the pollutant of concern is sulfur dioxide. He makes the comparisons 
for four differently shaped damage functions: linear, sublinear, superlinear and 
kinked. This shape determines whether price control is preferred over quantity 
controls, spatially differentiated over uniform controls; and command-and-control 
regulations over economic instruments. Efficiency losses of uniform policy, for 
example, are proven to increase significantly as damages become superlinear, and 
becoming twice as costly than an efficient control for a kinked damage curve. The 
effect ambient air regulations have on the U.S. economy, as a whole, is also 
accounted for in this study.  
 
In a purely theoretical paper Kolstad (1987) sets out to determine how the slope 
of the marginal cost and benefit functions determines the degree of efficiency 
losses under uniform instruments.  Kolstad’s results indicate that the least error (in 
a welfare sense) from adopting uniform instruments is associated with linear costs 
and benefits and the most error is associated with sharply curved costs and 
benefits (i.e., steep marginal costs and benefits). It is therefore of importance to 
determine the shape of these curves and what parameters they are a function of, in 
order to determine the efficiency gains of spatially differentiated policy 
instruments.  
 
Including a dynamic parameter to the problem Bouzaher, Braden, & Johnson, 
(1990) obtain results indicating the efficiency gains of applying spatially 
differentiated policies, increase as pollution limits are tightened. Braden, Larson, 
& Herricks (1991), emphasize, in a case study, how administrative costs increase 
with higher degrees of spatial differentiation making the advantages of spatially 
differentiated policy instruments less pronounced. 
 
An approach to estimate the efficiency losses of different policy instruments 
using the summary statistics of a few variables is developed by Newell & Stavins 
(2003). In this article, the heterogeneity parameters causing the efficiency losses   30
of uniform instruments are identified and analyzed. The authors identify the 
underlying factors generating the inefficiency of uniform policies for three types 
of policies two of which are uniform and one a cost-effective charge. Their 
estimates are obtained by applying Taylor approximations on quadratic abatement 
cost functions. They provide a theoretical analysis of how cost savings of market 
based polices changes with the heterogeneity in emissions and marginal abatement 
costs. Their model is applied on nitrogen oxides emissions from electrical utilities 
in a group of Eastern United States, obtaining estimates that indicate cost savings 
of a market-based policy to be 51 percent in comparison to a uniform emission 
rate standard respective 44 percent in comparison to a uniform percentage 
reduction standard. The authors show how increased regulatory flexibility can 
yield increased cost savings, and the extent of such savings depends on the degree 
of heterogeneity.  
 
Gren (2004) compare a regulator’s net benefits under uniform and differentiated 
policies taking into consideration an asymmetry in hidden information regarding 
the farmer’s abatement cost. The farmers are separated, with their respective 
probability, depending on whether they are low or high cost types. Gren shows 
that the relative advantages of a differentiated policy depend on the slope of cost 
and benefit functions as pointed out by Kolstad (1987), as well as the covariance 
between marginal abatement cost and the derivative of land use with respect to 
type. When, in absolute terms, the change in marginal environmental benefits is 
larger (smaller) than the change in marginal provision costs, a differentiated policy 
generates larger (smaller) expected net benefits than a uniform policy’ (p70). A 
linear abatement cost function implies higher net benefit under the differentiated 
policy than under the uniform. She applies the theoretical method on wetland 
creation, reducing the nutrient load, in the Laholm Bay drainage basin located in 
the southwest of Sweden. Due to the linear abatement cost function of wetland a 
differentiated policy generates net benefits four times larger than a uniform.   
 
Nationally vs. locally determined effluent charges 
A debate took place in the American Economic Review in the seventies regarding 
whether ambient targets should be determined on a national or local level. Even 
though this debate concerned the administrative aspect of ambient quality policies, 
it touched upon the same issues as the discussion above. The debate especially 
discussed the transfer coefficient of the pollutant transport from source to the 
recipient and the generated benefits of reducing the damage on a recipient of 
concern. 
 
Stein (1971) criticizes the president’s council’s argument that effluent charges 
should be set locally, and argues that a uniform charge on pollution should be 
determined on a national level. His point is that if environmental amenity belongs 
to the U.S. as a whole, the marginal product of the environment should be the 
same everywhere and therefore regulation cannot be differentiated as long as the 
environment is regarded as a national good. This article became the subject of 
much criticism and starts a debate that would last in the American Economic 
Review for six years. 
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The first attack on Stein came from Kneese a year later (1972), who questions 
Stein’s proposal of nationally determined charges. Kneese’s argument is based on 
the fact that the damage function of a pollutant might differ geographically, 
depending on natural factors, implying that a uniform regulation of emissions can 
never be the first-best solution. Instead, charging a dollar for a dollar’s worth of 
damage requires quite different rates of charge per pound of discharge depending 
on the locality, according to Kneese. Peltzman & Tideman (1972) join the 
discussion by stating that Stein’s article contains logical errors. They argue that 
Stein ignores the essential spatial aspects of the pollution problem, fails to 
distinguish between the desirability of a single price and that of having a single 
price setter, and fails to distinguish between the relevant short and long runs’ 
(p.959), thereby also introducing the dynamic aspect into the debate. Only under 
very unrealistic assumptions can a nationally uniform pollution charge be optimal 
in the long run, according to the authors.  
 
In 1974, Lerner enters the debate, and criticizes Stein, arguing that Stein seems 
to confuse ‘a unit of pollution, in some physical sense, with a unit of pollution 
damage which ultimately can only be a subjective evaluation’ (p.716).  On the 
other hand, he agrees with Stein that a charge of pollution damage must be 
uniform nationally, but since it is only the local population that feels the damage, 
he sides with Kneese (1972) that  ‘the only national principle to be laid down is 
that a dollar’s worth of pollution damage must be charged a dollar’ (p716). In 
Stein’s (1974) response, he makes it clear that it is the pollution damage that 
should be subject to a uniform national price and not the pollution itself, thereby 
allowing for different prices per pollution in different localities. He acknowledge 
that “the distinction is not sufficiently clear” in his previous article. However, 
Stein does not agree with Lerner that it is only the local population that feels the 
damage of pollution, since there can clearly be spill over effects since the 
environmental goods in that region might be a public good for all residents in the 
nation, whether they live in that region or not.  
 
Menz & Miller  (1977) discuss whether uniform nationwide prices for pollution 
damage are necessary for economic efficiency. They argue that Stein’s result is 
based on a rather restrictive specification of the social welfare function that does 
not allow for differences in regional preferences for environmental quality. In the 
presence of such differences, nationwide uniformity of prices for pollution damage 
is unlikely to be efficient, even when environmental quality is a national public 
good. They develop a model showing that at any point in time, the existence of 
environmental spill over from one locality to another is not a sufficient condition 
for nationwide uniformity of pollution damage prices. 
 
In the final article of the debate, Lerner (1977) characterizes the dispute between 
himself and Stein as involving a minor and a major issue. The minor issue 
concerns the distinction between charging pollution or pollution damage, while the 
major issues relate to whether charges should be determined on a national (Stein’s 
position) or local level. Regarding the minor issue, he argues that the problem lies 
in the different definition of pollution damage between them. Lerner claims that 
Stein’s pollution damage is a physical argument in the utility function, since he 
argues for a uniform charge per unit decrease increase in the impurity of water.   32
Each separate act of pollution must be judged and charged according to the 
damage to the utilities of the people affected. No physical measure can substitute 
for this. The major issue, whether charges should be determined on a national, 
cannot be resolved without empirical proof that everybody in the nation is 
damaged by every externality. 
 
Questions answered and raised in the quest for an optimal policy under 
spatial heterogeneity 
As can be seen from the literature, the quest for an optimal policy has been going 
on for a while. At first, the complex nature of reaching an ambient target under 
spatial heterogeneity was in focus. How to determine the optimal target and 
stringency of pollution abatement policy in the presence of externalities across 
administrative borders was discussed in the seventies. It has also been debated 
whether to focus on an ambient quality target policy or a policy targeting the 
emissions at source.  Some articles have questioned the feasibility of market based 
policy instruments and effluent charges in particular. The role of the transfer 
function between source and recipient, its implications regarding the choice of 
policy has been discussed thoroughly. The literature provides several empirical 
studies comparing the costs of different policies under different settings and in 
different cases, the majority of them finding significant efficiency losses of 
uniform policies. Lately, the discussion has evolved around the factors causing the 
efficiency losses of uniform policies. Not much work has been done regarding the 
transaction costs related to cost-effective differentiated policies.  
   
The quest for an optimal policy aimed at an ambient target is likely to continue, 
considering that an agreement concerning the most preferable policy hasn’t been 
reached. One answer behind this might be that the optimal policy depends on the 
characteristics and complexity of the spatial aspects of the environmental problem 
studied. The papers of this thesis tackle the complexity of managing a recipient in 
the presence of spatial heterogeneity cost-effectively. A major part of this thesis is 
to link abatement cost at source with the damage of the recipient of concern. This 
thesis provides empirical comparison of costs for different policies, cost-effective 
as well as uniform. The identification and analysis of parameters explaining the 
efficiency losses of uniform policies are extended in this thesis. Especially how 
the shape of the marginal abatement cost curve, at source as well as recipient, and 
the transfer coefficient, affects the efficiency losses of different uniform policies is 
described. How uncertainties in the transfer coefficient, between source and 
recipient, affects the allocation of emission abatement as well as the policy 
instruments is also accounted for.  
 
 
Scope of the research 
 
This thesis focuses on the cost-effective managing of a coastal zone in the 
presence of spatial heterogeneity regarding emission sources. By adopting a 
source-recipient approach and applying it to the region studied, a cost-effective 
allocation of abatement measures is determined. Estimating the cost of different   33
policy options and analyzing the underlying factors behind these costs provides 
important insights in the quest for the least-cost strategy. 
 
A main characteristic of all four articles is the presence of spatial heterogeneity 
regarding the transformation of the pollutant in question on its trajectory from 
source to recipient. Together with any heterogeneity of marginal transaction costs 
at the source, this calls for the need of spatially differentiated policy instruments in 
order to obtain a cost-effective allocation of abatement. As mentioned before, the 
three first articles of this thesis are applied to the nitrogen load into the Stockholm 
Archipelago, which is a coastal zone of the Baltic Sea, degraded by 
eutrophication. 
 
The same theoretical model is used in the empirical part of all four articles in 
order to obtain estimates regarding costs of abatement as well as different policy 
instruments. This model, connecting emissions from sources with the damage they 
generate at the recipient as well as taking the interdependency between abatement 
measures into consideration, is used for determining a cost-effective allocation of 
abatement measures. In article II, the estimates of this model are compared to the 
estimates of a model able to approximate cost estimates using less information. In 
article III the model is used to estimate the efficiency losses of uniform policies. In 
article IV the model is applied for a smaller part of this coastal zone, 
Himmerfjärden, and its adjacent catchment area consisting of four drainage basins.  
 
 General questions to be answered 
Apart from connecting the cost of abatement with the benefits they generate at the 
recipient, there are three major questions to be answered by the articles of this 
thesis. The objective of article I is to answer the question: what is the efficient 
nitrogen load to the Stockholm Archipelago and by what allocation of abatement 
measures should it be reached? Article II aims at answering the question whether 
cost approximations as developed by Newell & Stavins (2003) are accurate in 
estimating cost differences between uniform and cost-effective policies. How 
different policy instruments differ with regard to cost and what explains these 
differences are the questions to be answered by article III. Article IV answers the 
question on how the cost-effective allocation of abatement of reaching a nitrogen 
reduction target to marine waters is effected by including the uncertainties of 
pollutant transport, and the buffering capacity of coastal basins.  
 
Summaries of articles 
Article I – The efficient management of eutrophic coastal zones in theory 
and practice: an application of nitrogen reduction to the Stockholm 
Archipelago 
To connect nitrogen abatement cost with the benefits generated in the Stockholm 
Archipelago in order to determine decision rules for efficiency and cost-
effectiveness is the first task of article I. Such connection is vital in order to 
determine the efficient nitrogen load to this recipient. The methodology of this 
article resembles that of Gren (1993), Gren et al. (1997). The article considers four   34
different abatement measures: reduced application of fertilizers, cultivation of 
catch crops, wetland construction, and reduced nitrogen discharges at wastewater 
treatment plants using best available technology. The interdependency between 
these abatement measures is included in the model. The river basin of the 
Stockholm Archipelago is divided into 33 drainage basins differing with regard to 
abatement cost, nitrogen transport and abatement capacity. 
 
Data from 1998, when possible, were used. Since the underlying assumption of 
a constant marginal benefit curve can be questioned, a decision rule for reaching 
either the valued 1-meter water transparency improvement or the politically 
determined 50 percent reduction target is also accounted for. Results are, 
therefore, obtained for three different decision rules. The conditions for 
differentiated charges and tradable permits, triggering the cost-effective allocation 
of abatement are also described in this article.  
 
Results indicate that there are substantial gains to be made by reducing the 
nitrogen load to the Stockholm Archipelago. By definition, the largest gains, 524 
million Swedish crowns (MSEK) per year, are obtained at a nitrogen load level 
where marginal costs of abatement equals marginal benefit, i.e. efficiency in 
abatement (8.9288 SEK = 1 Euro, 1998). This implied a reduction of the load by 
51.2 percent, a reduction that differs little from the politically determined 50 
percent reduction, which in accordance generated gains differing insignificantly 
(MSEK 523/year). A 1-meter water transparency improvement requires a 40 
percent load reduction and generated annual gains of MSEK 443.  
 
For any significant reduction level, abatement by wastewater treatment plants as 
well as reduction of fertilizer application from farmed lands are necessary. 
Construction of wetlands is only required for reduction targets exceeding 40 
percent while catch crops cultivation only should be implemented for reduction 
targets over 50 percent. The present policies, to a large extent characterized by 
uniformity and somewhat arbitrarily set abatement requirements, would not be 
able to achieve any reduction target cost-effectively. Instead, a spatially 
differentiated policy instrument is required in order to ensure that the market 
solution is equivalent to the cost-effective allocation of abatement measures. 
 
The article raises the question of exactly how much is to be gained by spatially 
differentiated policy instruments in comparison with a uniform policy. 
 
Article II – Comparing two approaches of estimating costs of uniform and 
spatially differentiated policy instruments  
Article II can be seen as an extension on article I regarding the role of spatial 
heterogeneity in the quest for the optimal policy. However, the main objective of 
this article is to determine how the cost approximations developed by Newell & 
Stavins (2003) performs in estimating the cost of a uniform and a spatially 
differentiated tax on fertilizers in the Mälar region in comparison to actual 
estimates using a full-data set. What makes the cost approximations of Newell & 
Stavins’s method attractive is that they require only certain summary statistics in 
order to estimate costs of different policy standards. Another attractive feature is   35
that they provide some important insights to the explanatory variables behind the 
efficiency losses of uniform policies. 
 
The theoretical approach in the article is based on the model developed by 
Newell & Stavins. But, while they considered heterogeneity in marginal abatement 
cost at the source, this article deals with heterogeneity of marginal abatement cost 
to the recipient being a function of marginal abatement cost at source as well as 
the impact these sources has on the recipient. The article also includes the 
presence of capacity constraints regarding the abatement measure in question. 
Abatement cost is estimated for a spatially differentiated charge on fertilizers as 
well as one requiring a uniform percentage reduction of emissions from fertilizers 
using their approach. These estimates are then compared with the abatement cost 
of the two different policies obtained from a complete data-set. Only abatement by 
fertilizer reduction is considered as a measure while the three other abatement 
measures of article I are excluded since cost approximations cannot be estimated 
for abatement measures characterized by constant marginal abatement cost, which 
is an assumption made concerning the cost functions of these measures. Efficiency 
losses related to the present uniform tax on fertilizers, are also estimated using the 
full data set, but analyzed using the cost approximation expressions.  
 
The results of this article indicate that Newell & Stavins’s method is successful 
in estimating the cost of a cost-effective spatially differentiated tax on fertilizers. 
However, the presence of capacity constraints causes the approximation of the 
cost-effective case to be less accurate under more stringent reduction targets. The 
cost approximations of a uniform charge overestimated the actual cost to a larger 
extent, which could be explained by the underlying assumptions of this method. 
The article shows that the present uniform tax on fertilizers of SEK 1.80 Kg/N 
implies annual efficiency losses of MSEK 2.12 in comparison to a cost-effective 
solution. 
 
Article III - Efficiency losses of uniform policy instruments in the presence 
of spatial heterogeneity of marginal abatement cost 
The comparison of costs between different policy instruments continues in article 
III, but includes the other three abatement measures into the empirical application. 
Costs here are estimated by a measure-by-measure programming using the 
complete data-set. This article separates the abatement cost to recipient of article II 
into its two components; abatement cost at source and impact on the recipient by 
emission. Three different types of uniform instruments are in this article compared 
to the cost-effective spatially differentiated policy instrument (SDPI). These three 
uniform policies are: uniform charge on emissions for all sources, uniform 
percentage reduction by sources as well as a uniform percentage reduction by 
regions, in this case the drainage basins. Sources are wastewater treatment plants 
and farmed land and their emissions are nitrogen leakage from the root zone for 
the latter and discharges into a body of water for the former. The article shows that 
efficiency losses related to uniform policies to a large degree is explained by the 
variance in emissions, slope of marginal abatement cost curve at source, and 
impact on recipient as well as the covariance between these three. Efficiency 
losses of a uniform charge are explained by variance in impact and any covariance   36
between impact and the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. Variations in 
emissions and slope of marginal cost curve at source have no influence on the cost 
of this policy since it is cost-effective at source. 
 
Results indicate significant efficiency losses of the uniform policies. A policy 
requiring each source to reduce their emissions by the same percentage comes out 
as approximately twice as expensive than a cost-effective SDPI for most reduction 
targets. A uniform percentage reduction by regions is 50 percent more costly, 
while a uniform charge is around 30 percent more expensive. 
 
Article IV– Cost effective management of stochastic coastal water pollution 
By including the probability of reaching the target into the decision rule, article IV 
takes into consideration the uncertainty in reaching a predetermined load due to 
the stochastic nature of the pollutant transportation. Article IV shows how the 
presence of uncertainties regarding the transport of pollutants affects the cost of 
reducing the nitrogen load to a recipient. The nitrogen transport in-between the 
different water basin of Himmerfjärden and its implications for the decision rule of 
reaching a targeted load to the Baltic Sea are also included into the model. In a 
stochastic approach, such as this, the impact of abatement measures on both the 
mean and the variance of the pollutants load to a recipient are of interest. 
Therefore, the pollutant transport from land to the coastal zone is considered to be 
a stochastic variable.  
 
Costs are estimated for a 50 percent reduction in the nitrogen load from 
Himmerfjärden to the Baltic Sea, based on the Helsinki ministerial agreement 
(Helcom, 1993). The 50 percent reduction target can be reached at different 
probabilities ranging from 0.5 to 1, where 0.5 represents the case when variations 
in pollutant load have no impact on the decision problem. In this setting, the 
allocation of abatement measured within a drainage basin is determined by the 
marginal costs, expected marginal decrease in pollutant loads, risk attitudes as 
expressed in the choices of probability, coefficient of variation, and the changes in 
variances of pollutant loads. The exchange of the pollutant between different 
coastal basins, also considering their respective buffer capacity, is included into 
the model since it has an effect on the pollutant load to marine waters. Whether or 
not the consideration of coastal transport implies a higher total cost for a given 
marine water target depends on the relation between marginal costs of pollutant 
reductions to the coastal basins and the coastal water transport coefficients. How 
to design market based policy instruments, charges and permit trading ratios, in 
this model setting is also discussed.  
 
The theoretical model is applied on Himmerfjärden and its drainage basins, 
situated somewhat southwest of the Stockholm Archipelago. Himmerfjärden is 
divided into four coastal basins as defined by sea bottom thresholds.  These 
coastal basins work as a nitrogen sink with respect to the load entering the marine 
water of the Baltic Sea, which is implied by the fact that only 1/3 of the nitrogen 
load entering the coastal basins ends up in the Baltic Sea. Two targets are used in 
this article, with and without consideration for these coastal transports, for 
reducing nitrogen the nitrogen load to the Baltic Sea from the drainage basins of   37
Himmerfjärden. Nitrogen abatement is done at wastewater treatment plants, by 
reducing the application of fertilizers, and construction of wetlands. Of these 
measures, only wetlands affect the variations in nitrogen transport, and will, 
therefore, influence the decision rule under a stochastic approach. To reduce the 
nitrogen load to the coastal waters by 50 percent, implies a minimum cost of 8.3 
millions SEK (MSEK), while the cost to reduce the nitrogen load to the Baltic Sea 
by the same fraction only costs 6 MSEK. Considering coastal transports of 
nitrogen, the total cost of reaching the targeted load to the Baltic Sea is reduced by 
at least 20 percent. 
 
Main contributions of articles 
The main contributions of the four articles of are mainly empirical conclusions for 
this region regarding the efficient load of nitrogen to the Stockholm Archipelago 
and the costs for different policies in achieving this and other targets. 
 
Article I suggests that there are potential gains to be made by decreasing the 
nutrient load to the Stockholm Archipelago. The article emphasizes the necessity 
to link marginal abatement cost with marginal benefits in order to determine an 
efficient coastal zone management. This implies the importance of reliable 
information when dealing with spatial heterogeneity. The allocation of abatement 
measures for reaching any of the three targets suggests the necessity to focus on 
measures with large impact on the load and relatively low marginal abatement cost 
at the source. Further, it shows how present policies are not cost-effective and 
unable to reach the efficient load.  
 
Article II gives some support to the method developed by Newell & Stavins 
(2003) of estimating costs of policy instruments using summary statistics. The 
article shows that their model can be applied to an ambient reduction target. 
However, it is shown that this method should be used with caution especially in 
the presence of significant heterogeneity, capacity constraints, and large reduction 
targets. The article shows a negative effect on the accuracy of these estimates 
when capacity constraints are met. With significant differences in marginal 
abatement cost it is likely that sources with low marginal abatement cost should 
reduce as much as possible even for small reduction targets. Article II also gives 
an estimate regarding the efficiency losses of the current uniform tax on fertilizers.  
 
The main contribution of article III is to enhance the understanding of how the 
choice of policy affects total abatement cost. The article provides conclusions 
concerning the inefficiency of different types of uniform instruments under spatial 
heterogeneity, and some guidelines with regard to choosing a second-best policy. 
The article also provides insights concerning the underlying factors of efficiency 
losses for all three uniform policies. Results indicate that for this region, the 
efficiency losses of a uniform charge are not substantial, which might be explained 
by a negative covariance between the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve 
and impact on the recipient. The differences in costs between uniform over 
sources and uniform over regions, gives some insights regarding potential 
efficiency losses of international agreements where each participating country is 
required to reduce its emissions of a certain pollutant by the same percentage.   38
 
Article IV show that costs of reducing the nitrogen load to the marine waters of 
the Baltic Sea change dramatically when considering stochastic pollutant 
transports and including coastal nitrogen transports. Including the coastal transport 
of the pollutant into the model lowers total costs of reaching a target, due to the 
buffering capacities of the coastal water basins. By considering the random impact 
together with the assumption of risk-averse attitude or convex damage functions a 
higher total pollution reduction requirement for the recipient is necessary, 
implying higher costs than if only expected outcomes are considered. Including 
the abatement measure’s effect on the variations in load also affects the cost-
effective allocation of these measures. If wetlands increase (decrease) the variance 
in the load their value as abatement measure decreases (increases) relative to a 
measure only affecting the expected load. This value is enhanced for higher 
probabilities of reaching a certain target. This article emphasizes the importance of 
taking uncertainties regarding the transport coefficients into consideration in the 
quest for a cost-effective management of coastal zones.  
 
Suggestions for future research 
Due to data constraints, several assumptions and simplifications have been made 
with regard to the cost and benefit functions used in the thesis. Some topics for 
future research are simply found by relaxing some of the underlying assumptions.   
 
Cost functions are used to predict how actors respond in their behaviour to 
changes in input or output factors. Some of the cost functions of this thesis could 
clearly be questioned on the basis of underlying assumptions. One such 
assumption in this thesis is that everything is compensated for in the economy 
except nitrogen, which is made for the sake of simplicity. To relax this assumption 
and include other market imperfection regarding prices or presence of non-
efficient subsidies and/or taxes could be subject for further research. The 
assumption of a constant marginal benefit curve regarding the improvement of 
water transparency in article I, has implications regarding the reliability of the 
efficient load level obtained. Significant improvements could be made in the case 
study by estimating the slope of the marginal benefit curve of improved water 
transparency. Such an extension would generate more certainty regarding the 
Pareto-optimal nitrogen load. A closely related extension would be to separate the 
recipient into several basins, differing with regard to impact by load and 
willingness to pay for abatement. Including phosphorus into the analysis is of 
great importance as shown by Elofsson (2003), as well as the interaction between 
the two nutrients.   
 
There are uncertainties related to the data used in the articles due to the 
assumptions made as well as the impossibility to obtain models that describes 
relevant natural processes perfectly. The effect of uncertainties could be added to 
article I, especially regarding uncertainties of reaching the target due to the 
temporal variability of the buffering capabilities from source to recipient (see e.g. 
Charnes & Cooper, 1963; Elofsson 2003; Fishelson, 1976; Adar & Griffin, 1976; 
Papakyriazis & Papakyriazis, 1998).  
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Article II and III could be extended by relaxing the assumption concerning 
normal distribution regarding the underlying parameters explaining the cost 
differences between different policies. Any presence of skewness and kurtosis of 
the relevant parameters would have implications on the efficiency losses of 
uniform policy as shown by Mendelsohn (1986). 
 
The role of transaction costs regarding the policies discussed is also excluded in 
the analysis of the articles. However, to incorporate transaction costs into the 
empirical application of the articles requires extensive data collection, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. To determine the true cost of achieving a certain 
reduction target with regard to the nitrogen load to the Stockholm Archipelago is 
impossible without including the transaction cost of implementing the policy in 
question. There are a number of, theoretical as well as empirical, studies made 
concerning the transaction costs of different policy instruments (see e.g. Atkinson 
& Tietenberg, 1982; Linder & McBride, 1983; Colby, 1990; Malik et al., 1993; 
Stavins, 1995; McCann & Easter, 1999; Braden et al., 2001; Netusil & Braden, 
2001; Kampas & White; 2002; Zylicz, 2003; Elofsson, 2003). An analysis of 
transaction costs would be most interesting to include regarding the analysis of 
article III. The challenge would be to determine what kind of transaction costs that 
changes with different policies and by what extent. Such analysis would be of 
significant importance in the quest for an optimal policy aimed at ambient targets 
under spatial heterogeneity.   
 
The choice in policy does not only stand between uniform and spatially 
differentiated policy instrument, as pointed out by Tietenberg (1978). A policy can 
be implemented for several different degrees of spatial differentiation, and a 
uniform charge represents merely the extreme case of zero spatial differentiation. 
The degree of spatial differentiation increases with the number of regions within a 
given area. An increased degree of spatially differentiated policy instrument 
reduces the cost of reaching the target, disregarding transaction costs (see 
Mendelsohn, 1986). To what degree a policy can be spatially differentiated 
depends on the availability of necessary data. The empirical work of this thesis has 
only considered one degree of spatial differentiation, i.e. a spatially differentiated 
policy over 33 regions. Another objective of future research would, therefore, be 
to compare the cost of a uniform policy (one region) with the cost of different 
degrees of spatially differentiated policy instrument, i.e. differentiated over 
different number of regions. The results regarding different policy instruments 
abatement costs in reaching a certain target have relied on the assumption of 
perfect compliance. How the enforcement of compliance should be made under a 
spatially differentiated policy instrument is a question interesting to focus on in 
future studies. 
 
This thesis only considers the damage caused by one pollutant, nitrogen, on one 
recipient, the Stockholm Archipelago, and ignores any upstream damage or 
damage on the Baltic Sea. Another topic for future research is, therefore, to 
include multiple recipients with different limiting nutrient (nitrogen or 
phosphorus), and separate targets (for studies regarding multiple receptors see e.g. 
Atkinson & Tietenberg; 1982; Krupnick et al., 1983; Bohm & Russell, 1985; 
Krupnick 1986; Ermoliev et al., 1996, Zylicz, 2003;). How the exchange of   40
nutrients between this coastal zone and the surrounding waters influence the 
efficient level of reduction is another topic for future research. 
 
The analysis of this thesis excludes the dynamic aspect of the problem in that it 
takes a static perspective, implying that it disregards the time lag between an 
abatement measure and its effect on the recipient. For a discussion concerning the 
dynamic aspect with regard to ambient quality targets see Segerson (1988) Horan 
et al. (1998, 2002), and Hart (2003). 
 
The geographical scale for which a case study is done have vital implications 
regarding the required information. For a small study area certain parameters 
might be disregarded since they might exhibit small variations in value for the area 
in question. For example, information concerning meteorological factors might be 
important when looking at national and international problems, while this 
parameter can be excluded for areas of smaller size, such as a river basin, since the 
meteorological variations might be insignificant within such a small geographic 
area.. In the case study area of article IV, that is a relatively small geographic area, 
data of leakage from specific crops were available and used instead of treating the 
leakage from agriculture as a function of applied amount of fertilizers only. It 
would be interesting to find out how data requirements change as the geographical 
scale of the study becomes either larger or smaller. 
 
    41
References  
 
Adar, Z., & Griffin, J. 1976. Uncertainty and the Choice of Pollution Control Instruments. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 3, 178—188.  
Abrams, L. & Barr, J. 1974 Corrective Taxes for Pollution Control: An application of the 
environmental pricing and standards systems to agriculture. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 1(4), 296—318. 
Arheimer, B. & Brandt M. 1998. Modelling nitrogen transport and retention in the 
catchment of southern Sweden. Ambio 27(6), 471—480. 
Atkinson, S. E., & Lewis, D. H. 1974. A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Alternative Air 
Quality Control Strategies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1(3), 
237—250. 
Atkinson, S. E., & Tietenberg, T. 1982. The Empirical Properties of Two classes of Designs 
for Transferable Discharge Permit Markets. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 9(2), 101—121. 
Baumol, W.J. 1972.  On Taxation and the Control of Externalities. American Economic 
Review 62(3), 307—322. 
Baumol, W.J. & Oates , W.E. 1971.  The Use of Standards and prices for protection of the 
Environment. Swedish Journal of Economics 73. 42—54. 
Bishop, R. & Heberlien, T. 1990. The Contingent Valuation Method, Economic Valuation 
of Natural Resources: Issues, Theory, and Applications. Johnson, R.L., and Johnson, 
G.V. eds., Boulder, CO: Westview press, 81—104. 
Bockstael, N., Hanemann, W. & Kling, C. 1987. Estimating the Value of Water Quality 
Improvements in a Recreational Demand Framework. Water Resources Research 23, 
May, 951—960. 
Bockstael, N., McConnell, K., & Strand, I. 1989. Measuring the Benefits of improvements 
in water quality: the Chesapeake Bay. Marine Resource Economics. 6. 1—18. 
Boesch, D. 2001. Science and Integrated Drainage Basin Coastal Management. Science and 
Integrated Coastal management, B. Von Bodungen and R.K. Turner, eds., Berlin, 
Dahlem University Press,  37—50. 
Bohm, P. & Russell, C.S. 1985. Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments, in 
Handbook of Natural Resources and Energy Economics, Kneese, A.V. & Sweeney, J.L., 
Eds. Vol. 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam/New York/ Oxford, 395—460. 
Bouzaher, A., Braden, J. B., & Johnson, G. V. 1990. A Dynamic Approach to a Class of 
Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Problems. Management Science 36(1), 1—15. 
Braden, J. B., Johnson, V., Bouzaher, A., & Miltz, D. 1989. Optimal Spatial Management 
of Agricultural Pollution. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71(2), 404—413. 
Braden, J. B., Larson, R., & Herricks, H. 1991. Impact Targets versus Discharge Standards 
in Agricultural Pollution Management. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
73(2), 388—387. 
Braden, J. B., Lawrence, B. A., Tampke, D., & Wu, P-I. 2001. A Displacement Model of 
regulatory Compliance and Costs. Land Economics  63(4), 323—336. 
Brännlund, R., & Gren, I-M. 1999. Costs of Uniform and Differentiated Charges on a 
Polluting Input: An Application to Nitrogen Fertilizers in Sweden. Topics in 
Environmental Economics, Ed. M. Boman. R. Brännlund. and  B. Kriström. 33—49. 
Carson, R., Flores, N. & Meade, N.  2001. Contingent Valuation: Controversies and 
Evidence. Environmental and Resource Economics 19, 173—210. 
Cederwall, H. & Elmgren, R. 1990. Biological Effects of Eutrophication in the Baltic Sea, 
Particularly the Coastal Zone. Ambio 14(3), 109—112. 
Charnes, A. & Cooper, W.W. 1963. deterministic Equivalents for Optimising and 
Satisfying under Chance Constraints. Operation Research 11(1), 18—39. 
Colby, B. 1990. Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics (Dec.), 1184—1192.  
Diamond, P.A. & Hausmann, J.A. 1994. Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better 
than No Number? Journal of Economic Perspectives 8(4), 45—64.   42
Elmgren, R. & Larsson U. 1997. Himmerfjärden, Changes in a nutrient enriched coastal 
ecosystem (in Swedish with English summary), Swedish environmental Protection 
Agency, Report No. 4565. 
Elofsson, K. 2003. Cost-effective Reductions of Stochastic Agricultural Loads to the Baltic 
Sea. Ecological Economics 47(1), 13—31. 
Engqvist, A. 1997 Vatten- och närsaltsutbyte I hela Himmerfjärden, in: Himmerfjärden. 
Changes in a Nutrient Enriched Coastal System (in Swedish with English summary), eds. 
Elmgren, R. & Larsson, U., Swedish environmental Protection Agency, Report No. 4565.  
Ermoliev, Y., Klassen, G., & Netjes, A. 1996. Adaptive Cost-Effective Ambient Charges 
under Incomplete Information. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
31(1), 37—48. 
Fishelson, G. 1976. Emission Control under Uncertainty. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 3, 189—197. 
Freeman, A. M., Haveman, R. H., & Kneese, A. V. 1973. The Economics of Environmental 
Policy. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Freeman, A. M. 2003. The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory 
and Methods. Second edition, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C. 
Färlin, J. 2002. Secchi Disc Relations and the Willingness to Pay for Improved Water 
Quality in the Stockholm Archipelago. Master Thesis 2002:2, Department of Systems 
Ecology, Stockholm University, Sweden.  
Granéli, E., Wallström K., Larsson U., Granéli W. & Elmgren R. 1990. Nutrient Limitation 
of Primary Production in the Baltic Sea Area. Ambio 14(3), 142—151. 
Gren, I-M. 1993. Alternative nitrogen reduction policies in the Mälar region, Sweden. 
Ecological Economics 7, 159—172. 
Gren, I-M.,  Söderqvist T. &  Wulff F. 1996. Lönar det sig att rena Östersjön? Ekonomisk 
Debatt 24(8), 643—655, (In Swedish). 
Gren, I-M., Jannke P. & Elofsson K. 1997. Cost-effective nutrient reductions to the Baltic 
Sea. Environmental and Resource Economics 10(4), 341—362. 
Gren, I-M., Russel. ,C., & Söderqvist, T. 2002. Bridging ecology and economics: 
reflections on the role of cost—benefit analysis and the design of interdisciplinary 
research. Economic Theory for the Environment: essays in honour of Karl-Göran Mäler. 
B. Kriström, P. Dasgupta, & K-G. Löfgren, eds. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 
Northampton, MA, USA. 162—183. 
Gren, I-M. 2004. Uniform or discriminating payments for environmental production on 
arable land under asymmetric information. European Review of Agricultural Economics 
31(1), 67—76. 
Hamlen, W. 1977. The Quasi-Optimal Price of Undepletable Externalities. The Bell Journal 
of Economics 8(1), 324—334. 
Hansen, L. G. 2002. Regulation of Non-Point Emissions: A Variance Based Mechanism. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 21(4), 303—316. 
Hart, R. 2003. Dynamic pollution control—time lags and optimal restoration of marine 
ecosystems.  Ecological  Economics 47. 79—93. 
Helcom, 1993. The Baltic Sea joint Comprehensive environmental action programme, 
Baltic Sea Environmental Proceedings No. 48, Helsinki, Finland. 
Helfand, G., & House, B. 1995. Regulating Nonpoint Source Pollution Under 
Heterogeneous Conditions. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77(4), 1024—
1032.  
Herzog, H. W. 1976. Economic Efficiency and Equity in Water Quality Control: Effluent 
Taxes and Information Requirements. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 2(3), 170—184. 
Horan, R., Shortle, J., & Abler, D. 1998. Ambient Taxes When Polluters Have Multiple 
Choices. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 36, 186—199. 
Horan, R., Shortle, J., & Abler, D. 2002. Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choices 
Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion. Environmental and Resource 
Economics 21, 189—202. 
Horner, G. 1975. Internalizing Agricultural Nitrogen Pollution Externalities: A case Study. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 57, 33—39.   43
Howe, C.W. 1994. Taxes Versus Tradable Discharge Permits: A Review in Light of the 
U.S. and European Experience. Environmental and Resource Economics 4(2), 151—169. 
Jacobs, J. J., & Casler, G. L. 1979. Internalizing Externalities of Phosphorus Discharges 
from Crop Production to Surface Water: Effluent Taxes versus Uniform Reductions. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics May, 309—312. 
Johansson, S. 1989. Näringsämnesbelastningen från Himmerfjärdens tillrinningsområde — 
En översikt av olika källor, Askölaboratoriet, Technical report No. 5 , Sweden. 
Johnsson, H. & Hoffman M. 1997. Nitrogen leaching from Swedish agriculture – 
calculations of normal leaching and possible measures. The Swedish Environmental 
Protection Board, Report 4741. (in Swedish with English summary). 
Kampas, A. & White, B. 2002. Emission versus Input Taxes for Diffuse Nitrate Pollution 
Control in the Presence of Transaction Costs. Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management 45(1), 129—139. 
Kneese, Allen V. 1964. The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management. The John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Kneese, A. & Bower, B. 1968. Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, 
Institutions. Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future. 
Kneese, A. V. 1971a. Environmental Pollution: Economics and Policy. American Economic 
Review papers and proceedings 61 (May), 154—166. 
Kneese, A. V. 1971b. Managing the Environment: International Economic Cooperation for 
Pollution Control. A. Kneese, S, Rolfe & J. Harned, eds New York: Praeger Publishers, 
255—274.   
Kneese, A. V. 1972. Pollution and Pricing. American Economic Review  62 (Dec.), 958. 
Kolstad, C. D. 1986. Empirical Properties of economic ‘Incentives and Command-and-
Control Regulations for Air Pollution Control. Land Economics 62(3), 250—268.  
Kolstad, C. D. 1987. Uniformity Versus Differentiation in Regulating Externalities. Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 14(4), 386—399. 
Krupnick, A. J. 1986. Costs of Alternative Policies  for the Control of Nitrogen Dioxide in 
Baltimore. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 13(2), 189—197. 
Krupnick, A., 1988. Reducing bay nutrients: an economic perspective. Md. Law Review 
47(2), 453—480. 
Krupnick, A. J., Oates, W. A., & Van De Verg, E. 1983. On Marketable Air-Pollution 
Permits: The Case for System of Pollution Offsets. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 10(3), 233—247. 
Lerner, A.P. 1974. Priorities and Pollution: Comment. American Economic Review 64 
(Sept.), 715—717. 
Lerner, A.P. 1977. Environment— Externalizing the Internalities? American Economic 
Review 67 (March.), 176—178. 
Linder, S. & McBride, M. 1984. Enforcement Costs and Regulatory Reform: The Agency 
and Firm Responses. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 11, 46—68. 
Lipton, D. 2004. The value of improved Water Quality to Chesapeake Bay Boaters. Marine 
Resource Economics 19(2), 265—270. 
Malik, A. S., Letson, D., & Crutchfield, S. R. 1993. Point/Nonpoint Source Trading of 
Pollution Abatement: Choosing the Right Trading Ratio. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 75(November), 959—967. 
McCann, L., & Easter W.K. 1999. Transaction Costs of Policies to Reduce Agricultural 
Phosphorous Pollution in the Minnesota River. Land Economics 75(3), 402—414. 
Mendelsohn, R. 1980. An Economic Analysis of Air Pollution From Coal-Fired Power 
Plants. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 7(1), 30—43. 
Mendelsohn, R. 1986 Regulating Heterogeneous Emissions. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 13, 301—312. 
Menz, F. & Miller, J. 1977. Local vs. National Pollution Control. American Economic 
Review 67 (March), 173—178. 
Mitsch, J., Day, J., Gilliam, W., Groffman, P., Hey, D., Randall, G. & Wang, N . 2001. 
Reducing Nitrogen Loading to the Gulf of Mexico from the Mississippi River Basin: 
Strategies to Counter a Persistent Ecological Problem. Bioscience 51(5), 373—338.   44
Montgomery, W.D. 1972. Markets in Licences and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 
Journal of Economic Theory 5, 395—418. 
Morgan, C. & Owens. N. 2001. Benefits of water quality policies: The Chesapeake Bay. 
Ecological Economics 39, 271—284. 
Netusil, N., & Braden, J. 2001. Transactions costs and sequential bargaining in transferable 
discharge permit markets. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 61, 
253—262. 
Newell, R. & Stavins, R. 2003. Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-
Based Policies. Journal of Regulatory Economics 23(1), 43—59. 
Nixon, S. W. 1985: Coastal marine eutrophication: A definition, social causes, and future 
concerns. Ophelia 41: 199—219. 
Papakyriazis, A. & Papakyriazis, P. 1998. Optimal Environmental Policy under Imperfect 
Information. Kybernetes 27(2), 137—154.  
Peltzman, S. & Tideman, T. 1972. Local Versus National Pollution Control: Note. 
American Economic Review 62 (Dec.), 959—963. 
Persson, G., Olsson H., & Willén, E. 1989. The water quality of Lake Mälaren during 20 
years. The Swedish Environmental Protection Board, Report no. 3759. (In Swedish with 
an English summary). 
Phillips, C.V. & Zeckhauser, R. J. 1989. Contingent valuation of damage to natural 
resources. How Accurate? How Appropriate? Toxic Law Reporter October, 520—529. 
Pigou,  A.C. 1946. The Economics of Welfare. 4th Edition. Macmillian (London). 
Rabalais, N., Wiseman, W., Turner, R., Sengupta, B. & Dortch, Q. 1996. Nutrient changes 
in the Mississippi River and system responses on the adjacent continental shelf. Estuaries 
19(2B), 386—407. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. 1973. Effluent Charges: A Critique. Canadian Journal of Economics 
6(Nov.), 517—528. 
Rosenberg, R., Elmgren, R., Fleischer, S.,  Jonsson, P., Persson, G., &  Dahlin, H. 1990. 
Marine eutrophication case studies in Sweden. Ambio 19, 3: 102—108. 
Russel, C. 1971. Models for the Investigation of Industrial Responses to Residuals 
Management Actions. Swedish Journal of Economics 73, 134—156. 
Russel, C. & Spofford, W. 1972. A Quantitative Framework for Residual Management 
Decisions, Environmental Quality Analysis: Theory and Method in the Social Sciences. 
A. Kneese & B. Bower, eds. John Hopkins Press, Baltimore. 
Sandström, M., Scharin H. & Söderqvist, T. 2000. Seaside recreation in the Stockholm 
Archipelago: travel patterns and costs. Beijer Discussion Paper Series No. 129. Beijer 
International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish academy of 
Sciences, Stockholm. 
Segerson, K. 1988. Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 15(1), 87—98. 
Sharp, B., & Bromley, D. 1979. Agricultural Pollution: The Economics of Coordination, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61, 591—600. 
Shortle, J.S., & Dunn, J.W. 1986. The Relative Efficiency of Agricultural Source Water 
Pollution Control Policies. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68 (August), 
668—677. 
Soutukorva, Å. 2001. “The value of improved water quality. A random utility model of 
recreation in the Stockholm Archipelago”. Beijer Discussion Paper Series No. 135. 
Statistics Sweden: Statistical data for drainage areas 1992. 1995. SCB and the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency, Na 11 SM 9501. (In Swedish with English summary). 
Stavins, R. N. 1995. Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 29, 133—148. 
Stein, J.L. 1971. The 1971 Report of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers: Micro-
economic Aspects of Public Policy. American Economic Review 61 (Sept.), 531—537. 
Stein, J.L. 1974. Priorities and Pollution: Reply. American Economic Review 64 (Sept.), 
718—723. 
Söderqvist, T. & Scharin H. 2000. The regional willingness to pay for a reduced 
eutrophication in the Stockholm Archipelago. Beijer Discussion Paper Series No. 128.   45
Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish academy of 
Sciences, Stockholm. 
Tietenberg, T. H. 1973a. Controlling Pollution by Price and Standard Systems: a General 
Equilibrium Analysis. Swedish Journal of Economics 75 (2), 193—203. 
Tietenberg, T. H. 1973b. Specific Taxes and the Control of Pollution: a General 
Equilibrium Analysis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(4), 503—522. 
Tietenberg, T. H. 1978a. The Quasi-Optimal Price of Undepletable Externalities: Comment. 
The Bell Journal of Economics 9(1), 287—291. 
Tietenberg, T. H. 1978b. Spatially Differentiated Air Pollutant Emission Charges: An 
Economic and Legal Analysis. Land Economics 54(3), 265—277. 
Tietenberg, T. H. 1980. Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary 
Source Air Pollution: A survey and Synthesis. Land Economics 56(4), 391—416. 
Tietenberg, T. 1988. Environmental Natural Resource Economics. 2nd Edition. Scott, 
Foresman and company, Glenview Illinois. 
Turner, R.K, Georgiou, S, Gren, I-M., Wulff, F., Barret, S., Söderqvist, T., Bateman, I.J., 
Folke, C., Langaas, S., Zylicz, T., Mäler, K-G. & Markovska, A. 1999. Managing 
nutrient fluxes and pollution in the Baltic: an interdisciplinary simulation study. 
Ecological Economics 30, 333—352. 
Willén, E. 2001. Four Decades on Research on the Swedish Large Lakes Mälaren, 
Hjälmaren, Vättern and Vänern: The Significance of Monitoring and Remedial Measures 
for a Substantial Society, Ambio 30(8), 458—466. 
Weitzman, M. L. 1974. Prices vs. Quantities. The Review of Economic Studies 41(4), 477—
491. 
Wulff, F. 2000. Impacts of changed nutrient loads on the Baltic Sea. Managing a Sea: the 
Ecological Economics of the Baltic. Gren I-M., Turner K. & Fredrik Wulff,, eds. 57—65. 
London, Earthscan Publications. 
Wulff, F., Bonsdorff E., Gren I-M., Johannson S. & A. Stigebrandt. 2001. Giving advice on 
cost-effective measures for a cleaner Baltic Sea: a challenge to science. Ambio 30(4-5),  
254—259. 
Zylicz, T. 2003. Instruments for water management at the drainage basin scale. Ecological 
Economics 47(1), 43—51. 
 
 
 